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Afterword 
Undoing the bonds of nation/rediscovering 
dead souls1 
Toby Miller 
David Rowe, Graeme Turner, Emma Waterton and their contributors have 
done us a profound service by tracing the commodification of Australian 
cultural policy over the last quarter of a century. Their point of departure, the 
Federal Government’s Creative Nation document, appeared in 1994. It 
forwarded a vision of the good life that was connected to commerce, but not 
limited to or by it – mammon was just one influence. 
Nevertheless, the abiding lesson from this collection is that the policy’s 
advocates birthed a commodified lifeworld, one that subsequently coursed 
through multicultural television, electronic games and pretty much everything 
in-between. Cultural nationalism was trumped by capitalism. In what follows, 
I’ll engage with that position in the context of my understanding of prior 
Australian history before considering nationalism and cosmopolitanism from 
an international perspective (usefully done in this volume’s chapter on 
Indigenous television by Ben Dibley and Graeme Turner). 
The Australian situation2 
Our editors discern ‘a pervasive tendency towards the commercialisation of 
national culture’ and ‘the increasing influence of globalism and/or 
transnationalism’. They argue that over the past two decades, a ‘cultural 
nationalist model … has been reconfigured and its discourses and principles, 
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on the whole, devalued’. The evidence lies in ‘a wave of deregulation and 
disinvestment across a range of cultural industries’. This transformation has 
reached the point where ‘culture now tends to be located in those portfolios 
most directly responsible for national economic and industrial development’.3 
Australia’s associated scholarly slippage from critical cultural policy 
studies to creative industries advocacy has been well-covered (see, for 
example, Turner 2011) and needs no further rehearsal in this context. Suffice 
it to say that my teeth started to gnash at the familiarity of this story, and to 
appreciate our editors’ and authors’ insights. The post-industrial futurism of 
the New York intellectuals of the 1960s has claimed its latest victims. The key 
‘sluggers’ – Daniel Bell (1977); Zbigniew Brzezinski (1969); and Alvin 
Toffler (1983) – saw their predictions for a ternary U.S. economy redisposed 
to remake Australia, as per the warping vision of their latter-day legatee, 
Richard Florida (2008), and his pride of obedient antipodean acolytes (who, 
for example, helped him do ‘a couple of very special things in, in Noosa’).4 
In some ways, the transformation traced in this volume is unsurprising. 
Sooner or later, attempts by artists, the third sector and progressive critics to 
put monetary value on cultural production in terms cognizable by reactionary 
econocrats, led to the dominance of the latter’s neoclassical sorcery. As Bogart 
tells Bergman in Casablanca (1943), ‘Maybe not today. Maybe not tomorrow, 
but soon, and for the rest of your life’. Merton’s (1936) rule of unintended 
consequences eagerly steps up to bat when conjunctures change, and formerly 
dominant discourses legitimize emergent forces or are transformed by them. 
The notion of art-for-art’s sake (remember that ‘l’art pour l’art’ was always 
something of a joke – after all, MGM Latinized it as a corporate motto, above 
that leonine roar) is always compromised by the overdetermining overlap of 
social and aesthetic norms and expectations. In Diego Rivera’s (1932, p. 51) 
famous words, ‘[A]rt is a social creation’. 
But there has been some kind of change. Always-already utilitarian uses of 
culture were once undertaken in the service of religion, the monarchy, or 
revolution. Now they seek to convert ‘at-risk’ youth in the global North to 
carefully calibrated, moderate conduct or to stimulate the services sector of 
the economy. George Yúdice (2009) uses the term ‘culture as resource’ to 
describe this mixture of identity politics, welfarism and secondary 
accumulation. The constitutive connection of cultural nationalism to corporate 
norms and state desires has been a defining problem for Australian 
historiography and the Left around the world (Pascoe 1979; Anderson 2016). 
The Enlightenment teleologies of liberal and Marxist histories have never 
known how to manage the petty thuggishness and state violence of 
nationalism and its persistent capacity to overcome supposed world-historical 
agents of magical change, be they bourgeois individuals or social classes. In 
the Australian case, encounters between race and class have provided crucial 
fault-lines for understanding the past. Along with the dispossession of native 
peoples, the pre-Federation Australian Labor Party’s (ALP’s) strident anti-
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Asian rhetoric in the name of high wages helped to birth the country’s 
constitutive racism (McQueen 2004). The Liberal Party’s belated discovery 
of nationalism as a vote-winner in the 1970s was, in turn, an answer to the 
ALP’s similarly belated discovery of working-class migrants as an industrial 
and psephological bloc, despite hopes that it bespoke a shift from nationalism 
to multiculturalism (Castles et al. 1988). The history is outlined in this book’s 
chapter on multiculturalism by Ien Ang and Greg Noble. 
Australia has dependent cultural relations with the U.S. and the UK and 
economic ones with those nations, plus China and Japan. The economy has 
always been an intimate issue for this semi-peripheral, semi-metropolitan 
nation – wealthy but weak, worried yet weary, arrogant and anxious, vexed 
while vested. Born from post-imperial protectionism, and dependent for its 
development on being a farm and a quarry, Australia embodies the Dutch 
Disease (Ebrahim-zadeh 2003) so fully that it has generated its very own 
Gregory Thesis (1976). 
Capital investment in natural resources has largely precluded the 
development of industries that add value through local labour, ever since 
neoliberal warlocks flexed their muscles via the first Whitlam government’s 
assault on manufacturing through tariff cuts and the weasel-words ‘Industries 
Assistance Commission’ (Warhurst 1982). Twenty years later, just prior to 
Creative Nation’s release, the task of building neoliberalism was declared by 
some to have overtaken that of nation-building (Pusey 1991). 
Unsurprisingly, cultural policy in Australia indexes that story. It has 
routinely ‘double-declutched’ between artistic and industrial norms, from 
representing the nation to funding capitalists, from avant-garde short cinema 
to tax breaks for indolent local and Yanqui producers (Dermody and Jacka 
1987; Burns and Eltham 2010) on the prowl for what they call free money 
(i.e., neither loans nor equity). Today’s museums, with their neoliberal talk of 
visitor experiences and diverse publics, inherit the legacy of early Australian 
anthropology’s British heritage in its museum-based dedication to racial 
difference (i.e., hierarchy – see, for example, Barrett and McManus 2007). 
And the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (formerly, Commission) has 
always been required to be popular in order not to appear elitist, while 
simultaneously being damned for taking away opportunities from the 
commercial sector by attracting mass audiences (Inglis 2006a, 2006b). I defer 
to Making Culture’s authors’ profound knowledge of Australia’s slippery shift 
from cultural policy to creative industries and its oleaginous embrace of 
contemporary capitalism as part of that manoeuvre. But it is worth noting just 
how pragmatic and discriminatory local nationalism has often been. And that 
takes me to nationalism on a different palette. 
Nationalism elsewhere 
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For conservative ethno-nationalists, the nation is a constant across history, 
albeit changing with time and circumstance (Herder 2002, p. 297). It is 
sustained through supposedly indelible ties: origin myths, languages, customs, 
physiques and religions (Smith 2000). But, for those more in thrall to 
modernity, such claims are always already historical fictions carved from 
invented traditions (for example, Hindutva today; Nandy 1998). Far from 
being the outcome of abiding mythologies, the materiality and idea of the 
nation derived from the Industrial Revolution, which brought places together 
that had not previously deemed themselves linked in any way. Relatively 
isolated, subsistence villages were transformed by the interdependence 
engendered by capitalist organizations, the commodification of everyday 
relations and the sense of unity generated from nation-binding technologies 
and institutions, most notably print and the public school (Gellner 1988). By 
the time of 1919’s Treaty of Versailles, the victorious powers regarded 
national self-determination (apart from freedom for their own ‘possessions’) 
as the best route to peace, along with a return to open markets and a state 
system of governance that would control the warlike tendencies of the losers 
and others. But imperialism was not dismantled, and when the Depression hit, 
the immediate response was restrictive trade practices, such as tariffs and 
other barriers. Alongside the emergence of fascist nationalism, it produced the 
conditions of possibility for the Second World War. Similar responses 
followed the oil shocks of the 1970s (Strange 1979). 
So, the idea of nations as guarantors of peace was compromised by the 
victors protecting their own empires, then distorting the trading system 
because of an enormous economic crisis. Meanwhile, the ideology of 
nationalism, always close to doctrines of autochthony, autarky and autarchy, 
was used by the emergent great powers (the USSR, Japan, Germany and Italy) 
to justify political or racial superiority in much the way that the established 
U.S., French and British imperialists did. Although the claims and efforts of 
ethno-nationalists frequently fail to override more universal ideas 
promulgated through religion, democracy and human rights (Horkheimer 
2013), where the bourgeoisie failed to adopt comprehensively liberal ideas, 
and technological connections across borders were countered by local 
demagoguery, collective ideas of superiority and destiny found fecund fields. 
A refusal to identify with humanity as a whole was at the core of this kind of 
nationalism (Adorno 1997, 2007; Adorno et al. 1950). Labour was conceived 
of as a national entity, along with ethnicity, ideology, and language, and new 
communications technologies were harnessed in the name of the sovereign-
state. Ethno-nationalist and modern theories blended. 
Consider the right-wing use of Gramsci’s idea of the national popular by 
authoritarian and dictatorial regimes across Latin America from the 1940s to 
the 1990s. They harnessed class interests secreted as national ones, which 
became common sense for both left and right (Galeano 1997). The same 
applies to South Asia and segments of the Arab and African worlds (Halliday 
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2005). The breakup of formal empires has seen an explosion of sovereign 
states and their attendant national myths. The number of countries across the 
globe has gone from a few dozen in 1945 to over 200 today, and most major 
conflicts since World War II have been over attempts to create new nations. 
At the same time, people keep leaving their places of birth in rapidly 
increasing numbers; mostly voluntarily, to make better lives for themselves, 
but also as desperate refugees. The United Nations (UN) estimates that 258 
million people were international migrants in 2017, up from 220 million in 
2010 and 173 million in 2000. The vast majority live in Asia, Europe and 
North America (United Nations 2017). That mobility correlates with global 
warming in a reordering of the old climate-determinism argument that intense 
aridity or humidity lead to centralized control of water and oversized irrigation 
public works, thereby breeding despotism (Missirian and Schlenker 2017; 
Wittfogel 1967). The corollary is a tension between what is left behind, taken 
with, encountered, rejected and adopted (Banks 2014). The globe is full of 
people who feel as though they do not belong, either where they have left or 
where they have landed, as they flee the agonies of origin and experience the 
refusals of arrival. The essential hybridity of humanity is challenged by ethno-
nationalism encountering global mobility, with each shaping the other. 
Nationalism is routinely and rightly damned for its maleness, brutality, 
warmongering, and other failings: Rosa Luxemburg (1986, p. 331) spoke for 
many when she denounced ‘the empty wordiness of nationalism as an 
instrument of bourgeois domination’. The absurdity of nationalism is not 
confined to the Right: the spectre of Stalin is never far behind, lurking in off-
screen space to jump us as if we were the second-last girl in an ’80s horror 
movie. ‘[T]he whole, disastrous experience of “state socialism” which came 
to so abrupt and dramatic an end in 1989’ has meant that ‘the entire historical 
basis and trajectory of “the left” in serious politics has had to be rethought’ 
(Hall 1995, pp. 25–26). And the desire of China to exercise ‘sharp power’ 
around the world takes culture as a core component of its desired hegemony 
(National Endowment for Democracy 2017). 
That said, C.L.R. James (with Dunayevskaya and Lee 1986) always 
recognised the importance of nationalism versus internationalism as a litmus 
test of anti-colonial credentials – that a cosmopolitan worldview relied on 
appreciating local circumstances and working within them. The real enemy 
was bureaucratization, not nationalism. For Althusser (1971), it was essential 
that revolutionary forces recognize their specific conditions of existence, in 
workplaces and countries, but also that they identify with others, far away, 
speaking other languages, yet oppressed by similar forms of labouring life. 
The nation was, therefore, crucial, but its chauvinistic incantation in culture 
worked to pervert the kinds of identification that it engendered unless they 
were played with and contested, as per critical Mexican cultural nationalism’s 
wry, ironic, yet respectful stance towards the country’s foundational 
mythology and its cynical use by élites (García Canclini 1982). 
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This is another history, of longing for self-determination and resisting 
imperialism. The nation has, of course, been a core resistive concept of 
decolonialization, providing a means of registering claims for inclusion in 
both narratives and institutions (Cabral 1973) – a veritable font of resistance 
to imperial suzerainty. Kwame Nkrumah (1969, p. 88) avowed that 
‘[n]ationalism is the ideological channel of the anti-colonialist struggle’ and 
Lyotard (1993, p. 238) viewed it as a key response to ‘the profound 
desocialization produced by imperialism’. Du Bois (1942, p. 72) referred to 
the ‘personal apostles of African nationalism, who wander across the vast 
distances of Africa and talk with the people’. And it is clear that peripheral 
and semi-peripheral nationalism can be democratizing and enabling as well as 
exclusionary and repressive. It successfully invokes theories and 
commitments that do not disappear, despite myths of anti-nationalism, 
globalization and technological determinism (Carey 2002). 
Cosmopolitanism? 
What of cosmopolitanism as an alternative, emerging from much older origins 
than those associated with contemporary neoliberalism and globalization? A 
core Enlightenment ideal, cosmopolitanism suffered with the ongoing triumph 
of the nation-state and nationalist ideology, but became au courant again due 
to the need for ways of living together in a globalizing economy with vast 
migration and cultural exchange. Its linguistic heritage blends universalism 
with particularism – an encounter between the cosmos and the citizen staged 
again and again since Aristotle and frequently leading to a profound 
suspiciousness and doubt about one’s loyalty (Benhabib 2011). This dialectic 
takes many forms: Edmund Burke (1774) addressing the electors of Bristol, 
Angela Davis (2003) calling for a new emancipation via the destruction of 
prisons, Jesus Christ teaching about universal equality and Immanuel Kant 
(2006) theorizing world citizenship. 
Negative responses to it can be powerful, such as British Prime Minister 
Teresa May’s (2016) asinine insult, ‘If you believe you’re a citizen of the 
world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word 
“citizenship” means’, and Stalin (1946) referring to Jewish people as ‘rootless 
cosmopolitans’ because he regarded international cultural consciousness and 
identification as inimical to Leninism. But, for H. G. Wells (1902, p. 317), 
Jewish mobility ‘gives the lie to our yapping “nationalisms”’. 
Global capital is often regarded as a sign of cosmopolitanism’s eventual 
triumph: socialists of the inter-war period welcomed multinational 
corporations as signs that economic nationalism had been succeeded by 
coordinated planning (Mandel 1968, p. 434). In the decolonizing burst from 
1947 to the late 1970s, while some new countries sought import-substitution 
industrialization, others moved more successfully towards an export-oriented 
model via the New International Division of Labour. East Asian states, in 
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particular, mobilized their reserve armies of peasantry to manufacture goods 
for the global North (Fröbel et al. 1980). Meanwhile, older nations in Latin 
America sought to elude, by any means possible, the horrors of dictatorship 
in the name of left or right-wing nationalism and the financial punishment 
meted out to leftist governments by international markets (Cardoso 2005; 
Vargas Llosa 2017). A third group favoured a fuller-throated Marxist anti-
imperialism (Amin 1997). All these formations brokered a middle ground 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. 
And something else was going on, both rhetorically and institutionally, 
towards cosmopolitanism. The histories of the League of Nations and the UN 
stand for the failure of world government. But their less grandiose, more 
technical subgroups have managed with reasonable success the international 
relations of telecommunications, postage, health and immigration. Those 
entities arose from a notion that the anarchic world of states could be governed 
in much the same way as individual sovereign states managed their 
populations. Beyond the utopian rhetoric of global peace that was so derided 
by realists (Miller 1981), classical theorists have argued for the success of a 
relatively ordered and peaceful world system since 1945 thanks to the strength 
of large states, their desire to eschew direct conflict with one another and the 
emergence of a raft of international organizations operating beyond territories 
and armies (Bull 2002). The comparatively technical tasks in which the 
International Telecommunication Union, World Health Organization and so 
on specialize have remained relatively free of conflict, by contrast with 
peacekeeping or culture. 
At the same time, the definition of what constitutes national identity is 
contested because of the necessary hybridity of humanity. Consider Colombia. 
Ethnic/racial difference is defined there in ways that are at variance with 
Anglo norms: the state counts people as mixed race who would be deemed 
Indigenous, black, Asian and so on in Anglo countries. The mestizo majority 
is mostly made up of citizens with mixed ethnicity, a blend of Indigenous, 
Afro-Colombian, Asian, European, Sephardim and Arabic heritage. The 
prevailing ideology of mestizaje assumes a norm in which Colombians are 
said to be a mosaic of Indigenous and Caucasian. As the popular saying goes, 
‘Aquí en Colombia somos muy mezclados’ [Here in Colombia we are all 
mixed] (Restrepo et al. 2014). The latest census (2005) identifies three non-
mestizo minorities: 87 national Indigenous groups, comprised of 1.4 million 
people who live communally and use their original languages (3.4 per cent of 
the overall population); 4.3 million Afro-Colombian descendants of slaves 
(10.6 per cent); and 5,000 Gitano [Roma] (0.01 per cent) (Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 2007, p. 33). These minorities suffer 
massive inequality, but part of their capacity to form themselves as blocs and 
argue for redress derives from cosmopolitan identifications with First Peoples 
and slave descendants elsewhere, and their deployment of Enlightenment 
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ideals (Cabezas-Cortés 2016; Perazzi and Merli 2017). But how does one deal 
with claims to universalism versus particular calls on rights in such situations? 
Will Kymlicka (1995) seeks a rapprochement in the white-settler colonies 
of Australia, the US, Canada, and Aotearoa/New Zealand between majority 
White settlement, ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ (newer voluntary migrants, 
who deserve few cultural rights) and ‘minority nationalism’ (First Peoples, the 
dispossessed and the enslaved, who deserve many) via the notion of culture 
as an aid to individual autonomy through engagement with collective as well 
as individual histories. Conversely, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1995, pp. 162, 
164) argues that cultural maintenance and development should be by-products 
of universal access to education, a ‘primary condition of free and equal citizen 
participation in public life’. She opposes public funding to sustain familial or 
religious cultural norms, calling instead for a curriculum that will generate 
flexible cosmopolitans who learn about their country and its ‘global 
neighbors’. Rorty’s argument is a culturalist restatement of human-capital 
nostra about individuals maximizing their utility through investment in skills. 
She rejects cross-cultural awareness as a necessary component of good 
citizenship and justice, but endorses it as good business sense; come on down 
the creative industries, and claim your prize. 
Conclusion 
I used to walk into cities pretty much anywhere and see monuments to 
socialism and national endeavour: the post office, railway station, telephone 
exchange, power station, clock tower and the public school – the great 
initiatives of socializing risk and equalizing access that made Western Europe, 
Australasia and North America modern. Today, their shady, shadowy 
equivalent is the data centre – our dirty, coal-powered euphemized cloud. It, 
too, relies on socialized risk – the corporation running it almost certainly 
receives public subsidies, no matter where the server farm is located in the 
world. But this is no public monument to the nation; rather, it is a clandestine 
testament to today’s norm of capitalism for the poor and socialism for the 
wealthy, secreted behind an everyday office-block façade (a cybertarian shift 
is well explained here in by Brett Hutchins’ chapter on the digital). 
November 2017, when I started drafting these words, found me in 
Catalunya, and a world where the centralizing force of capital seemed 
compromised by nationalist populism. Hundreds of thousands of people had 
marched the previous Saturday for the right to a referendum on independence. 
They wanted to become their own nation – or not; but above all, they wished 
to vote on the proposition. Anarchists, greens and leftists jumped on the local 
nationalist bandwagon – or perhaps they helped form it. Meanwhile, the 
political descendants of Franco who ran the government in Madrid sent in the 
Guardia Civil (akin to the Federal Police in Australia) to confront and batter 
those who attempted to vote. The international left rallied behind the Catalans. 
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I think that they were right in terms of the anti-democratic police brutality of 
the national government, but they needed to consider such questions as 
widespread corruption, bigotry and a secondary labour market in Catalunya: 
two of the most powerless groups, working-class migrants from Málaga and 
Latin America who built the region’s infrastructure and continue to 
characterize its proletariat. Catalans often refer to the two groups derisively as 
‘xarnega’ (Niño-Murcia and Rothman 2008). Many of them refuse to learn 
Català, and they generally oppose independence. And, at the same moment as 
this bloc was celebrated on the left elsewhere, 60,000 Poles were marching 
with banners that read: ‘Europe will be white or deserted’ and ‘Clean blood’. 
As The Economist (2017) has observed of resurgent nationalism: 
The Alternative for Germany has won 94 seats in the Bundestag. Marine 
Le Pen of the National Front won a third of the vote in France’s 
presidential election. In Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic 
nationalists have taken power, just as they did in Poland. 
The same article also cites Britain’s referendum vote to leave the European 
Union, Turkey’s increased militancy, moves away from constitutional 
pacifism in Japan, the power of Hindu supremacism in India, China’s heavily 
mythologised expansionism and Russian belligerence as examples of a global 
nationalist drift. 
Jean Baudrillard, annoying gadfly of the dialectic that he was, shared the 
following confession: 
I operate from a prejudiced position against nationalism, one which is anti-
nationalist, or even anti-cultural. Somewhere within me there is a distancing 
away from what is closer to the bone, for that which is closer to one’s own 
culture, one’s country, family is that from which one cannot escape. 
(2015, p. 92) 
Baudrillard is assuredly one of Samuel Huntington’s (2004) evocations of the 
‘dead souls’ lamented in Walter Scott’s (1805) poem ‘The Lay of the Last 
Minstrel,’ guilty of denying the value of national affinity. But is Stuart Hall 
(2010, p. 185), whose recollection of Britain’s birth of a New Left found him 
avowing that ‘[a]s a colonial, I certainly felt instinctively more at home in the 
more socially anonymous metropolitan culture’? 
Scott’s ode to nationalism, with its stirring lines ‘Breathes there the man, 
with soul so dead, Who never to himself hath said, This is my own, my native 
land!’ may resonate with Scotland’s struggle and complicity with English 
empire. But its arrogant denial of identifications beyond the immediate, and 
fetishization of national unity, is no model for today, tomorrow or soon. Yet it 
seems ineradicable. The dilemma that divided dissidents of the post-war 
Russian empire continues: ‘should Sovietization be resisted with 
cosmopolitanism or nationalism?’ (Kristeva 1997, p. 8). 
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The key lesson to draw from these writings is that, wherever the creative 
industries operate, regardless of their incarnation in culture, policy or business 
formations, their principal mission is to animate and empower capital 
(Kleinhans 2011). Now that the nation’s role in decolonization is formally 
over, it functions partly as an easy conduit for capital formation, and partly for 
its unfortunate diversion into ethnic identification. But that said, the cosmic 
ambivalence of my opening stanzas remains – as Perry Anderson (1989, 
p. 103) insists, nationalism is ‘a mass phenomenon of elemental force in the 
last two centuries’. Consider the concept of a minor literature – ‘the literature 
a minority makes in a major language … effected by a strong co-efficient of 
deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, p. 16). And there is a lengthy 
leftist history of accepting and even promoting the nation ‘as the primary 
mechanism of defense against the domination of foreign and/or global capital’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 44). 
Neoliberalism has a poor record of economic growth next to the statist 
capitalism of China’s ‘powerful, centralized state authority firmly committed 
to a policy of techno-nationalism that has its origins, well before the reform 
era, in Mao’s nation-building decades’ (Ross 2009, p. 54). That provocation 
recalls a moment in Harry Watt’s The Overlanders (1946), a British film set 
in Australia, when the laconically iconic Chips Rafferty rebukes John 
Fernside, who is playing a rather dubious English remittance man with plans 
for a ‘Northern Territory Exploitation Company’. Chips says it’s ‘a national 
job, too big for little people like you’.5 They’d been instructed to perform an 
impossible droving task to save the country from occupation, one recognizing 
that ‘bullocks are more important than bullets. The urgency and formality of 
the mission is that it is sent by telegram, that classic nation-binding technology 
of its day (a tendency examined in Graeme Turner’s television chapter here ). 
So this volume stands testimony to the continued relevance of just such a 
gentle but assertive form of nationalism, brokered through the hybridity of 
multicultural policies, as a blend of the cosmopolitan with the local that 
engages in a mixture of conflictual and complicit relations with capital. 
‘Staging’ that conflict is crucial if we are to make a difference. 
Notes 
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